THE UAE’S RETURN TO A DIPLOMACY-FIRST FOREIGN POLICY

Saudi Arabia and the UAE describe their relationship as a deep strategic partnership rooted in similar objectives towards regional stability and prosperity. While they remain aligned on many issues, particularly related to their stances on political Islam and ambitious plans for economic diversification, there could be more significant divergence as the UAE becomes closer to Israel. In fact, reports emerged last month about Saudi efforts to pressure the UAE to abandon the massive energy and water deal it recently signed with Jordan and Israel and work instead with Saudi Arabia. The fact that the UAE went ahead with the deal may indicate prioritisation of enhancing ties with Israel at the moment and, in so doing, becoming a greater regional power, which could potentially spur tension with Saudi Arabia.

Courtney Freer, Visiting Fellow, Middle East Centre, LSE

"It is hard to say what drives Syrian-Emirati relations. Secretive family elites run both countries. Formal channels won't tell the whole story. Sure, they didn't have an ambassador for a while, but Bashar's sister lives on and off in Abu Dhabi. What to make of that? The Emiratis now seem to think they can wean Assad off Iran—not fully, not even close, but a little bit—while countering Turkey. It's also part of a recent general rebalancing of Emirati foreign policy, tuning things down and finding a new footing. More fundamentally, though, it's about Assad having won the war. If you're a US or European president, it's easy to be very principled about conflicts very far away. But if you're an Arab ruler, Syria is in your neighbourhood. So, at some point, the Emiratis decided that if Assad won't go away, they're better off working with him."

Aron Lund, Researcher, Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI); and Fellow, The Century Foundation

"The November meeting between UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, the first in nearly a decade, marked a turning point in bilateral relations after a long rift that saw the two countries on the opposite sides of major regional crises. Mutual economic interests have been the main driver of this rapprochement. While Abu Dhabi is increasingly betting on economic diplomacy to foster its post-pandemic recovery, Ankara is looking for new investments and economic partners at a delicate time for its economy and fragile currency. The number of cooperation agreements signed between the two countries, a $10 billion fund allocated by the UAE for strategic investments in Turkey and talks about a possible swap agreement between central banks to build Turkish reserves and support a falling lira confirm the prevailing economic nature of the bilateral reconciliation. Although some bilateral knots persist at the political level within a changing region, both the UAE and Turkey share an interest in downscaling regional competition. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu's recent visit to the UAE, which precedes Erdogan's one in February, shows how committed both parties are in advancing down the path undertaken."

Valeria Talbot, Co-Head, MENA Centre, ISPI

"The UAE has deployed significant efforts over the past few years to develop relations with China in a wide range of sectors, from energy and trade to new technologies, health, and security, too. At a time when it is seeking to diversify its relations away from its traditional Western partners, and when the global economic centre of gravity is increasingly shifting to Asia, Abu Dhabi sees this relationship with China as an important investment for the future. This fast-developing partnership has, however, raised concerns in the US, which started putting growing pressures on the UAE over its cooperation with Huawei for 5G networks, and more recently over rumours of a Chinese base in the UAE. While the relationship with the US remains crucial, the UAE refuses to be forced to choose, and its recent threat to pull out of the F35 deal reflects this posturing."

Camille Lons, Research Associate, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

The record sale of 80 Rafale fighter jets to the UAE is a reminder of the enduring French influence in Abu Dhabi. Emmanuel Macron builds on the legacy of his predecessors who, for several decades, cultivated these ties through arms sales (France remains the second arms supplier to the UAE), defense agreements, and the 2008 opening of a military base in the UAE. Both countries also share similar regional views around Egypt, Libya, or the Iranian nuclear crisis, to name a few. Finally, the deal reflects frustration from both countries vis-à-vis Washington: France was blindsided by the AUKUS alliance and the subsequent cancellation of its submarine contract with Australia, while UAE-US negotiations over the sale of the F-35 have been dragging on for months.

Jean-Loup Samaan, Associate Research Fellow, Turkey and Middle East Program, IFRI